Operation Containment: State Force, Criminal Adaptation, and the Weaponization of Commercial Drones

On October 28, 2025, Brazilian authorities launched one of the largest urban security operations in the history of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, and potentially all of Latin America. Operação Contenção mobilized more than 2,500 officers from the Civil Police and the Military Police across the Alemão and Penha complexes, key strongholds of Comando Vermelho (CV), the country’s most powerful organized crime group.

According to the Public Defender’s Office of the State of Rio de Janeiro, the operation resulted in 132 fatalities, including two Civil Police officers, two BOPE operatives, and three civilians not directly involved in hostilities. The remaining deaths were attributed to alleged CV members. Initial reports also documented 81 arrests, including financial facilitators and armed operatives responsible for territorial defense. Authorities seized more than 110 high-caliber rifles, eight grenades, large quantities of ammunition, encrypted communications equipment, and over 30 stolen vehicles used for logistics and mobility.

While official figures differ across institutions, the operational picture is unambiguous: Operação Contenção constituted a high-intensity confrontation between state forces and a criminal organization employing increasingly militarized tactics. The most strategically significant development was the offensive deployment of modified commercial drones by Comando Vermelho to surveil, harass, and directly attack police units. This development marks a qualitative shift in Brazil’s urban security environment and reflects broader global trends in the convergence of organized crime, technology, and irregular warfare.

Criminal Drone Use: Platforms, Roles, and Tactical Effects

During the operation, security forces confirmed the presence of modified multirotor drones operated by CV. Open-source imagery and field reporting indicate that these systems were based on commercial quadcopter platforms, most likely from the DJI ecosystem (e.g., Mavic- or Mini-class airframes), widely available through Brazilian e-commerce platforms such as Mercado Livre. Although designed for civilian use, these drones typically include stabilized high-resolution cameras, GPS navigation, and sufficient payload capacity to carry small improvised explosive devices (IEDs).

Our findings, as detailed in The Unregulated Battlefield (Gordon Institute, FIU), show that non-state armed actors and criminal organizations increasingly rely on commercial unmanned aerial systems (UAS) to compensate for structural asymmetries vis-à-vis state forces. These platforms are attractive precisely because they are cheap, widely available, difficult to regulate effectively, and easily adaptable for military and paramilitary purposes.

In Operação Contenção, CV drones fulfilled two core functions consistent with this pattern. First, as ISR (intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance) platforms, they provided persistent overhead monitoring of police movements, early warning of advances, and real-time tactical coordination. Second, in an offensive role, some drones were adapted to release small improvised munitions, replicating techniques observed in contemporary irregular conflicts. Even limited explosive payloads can have outsized psychological and operational effects in dense urban terrain.

These developments must be understood within the structural conditions of Rio’s favelas. Vertical terrain, narrow corridors, dense construction, and constant civilian presence create an environment in which defenders with intimate terrain knowledge enjoy a structural advantage. CV fighters operate from within the community, control access points and escape routes, and can blend into the civilian population or employ police-style uniforms to confuse intervention units. Drones amplify this advantage by extending situational awareness upward, effectively granting criminal groups a contested aerial layer that erodes the state’s traditional informational superiority.

As we argue in our policy research, this dynamic directly challenges Clausewitz’s concept of the fog of war. Commercial drones reduce uncertainty for non-state actors by providing an aerial perspective that was previously monopolized by the state. In doing so, they function as tactical force multipliers, partially offsetting the asymmetry between state airpower—based on helicopters—and criminal groups that can now “take the sky” using adapted civilian technology.

State Drone Employment: Lessons from the Military Police Air Mobile Unit

Criminal innovation was met with extensive state drone deployment. The Military Police Air Mobile Unit (Grupamento Aeromóvel da Polícia Militar, GAM) fielded more than 50 unmanned aerial systems equipped with thermal imaging, infrared sensors, and long-range electro-optical cameras. These platforms proved essential for persistent surveillance of elevated terrain and for denying traditional safe havens used by CV operatives.

Reported capabilities include target identification at distances of up to five kilometers, enabling police units to maintain standoff distance, preserve surprise, and reduce exposure to ambush. Importantly, this capability was the product of deliberate institutional preparation. For more than two months prior to Operação Contenção, authorities conducted ISR missions to map routes, firing positions, and escape corridors, integrating drone-derived intelligence into operational planning and command decision-making.

From a policy perspective, the GAM experience illustrates how unmanned systems can be institutionalized as a core capability rather than an ad hoc tool. Training, doctrine, and data integration—rather than hardware alone—were decisive factors in operational effectiveness.

Post-Operation Adaptation and Escalation Dynamics

Although Comando Vermelho had previously experimented with drones, the October 2025 operation appears to have accelerated organizational learning and technological adaptation. Post-operation reporting and intercepted communications indicate internal discussions focused on acquiring additional drones, upgrading sensors, and procuring small UAVs equipped with thermal cameras and enhanced navigation systems. These upgrades aim to improve effectiveness during night operations, in vegetated buffer zones, and against police forces that themselves rely on commercial drone platforms.

This adaptive cycle aligns closely with our findings on escalation dynamics in unregulated battlespaces. Sustained state pressure incentivizes innovation; innovation increases operational confidence; and confidence raises the likelihood of retaliation. Comparable trajectories have been documented among the ELN in Colombia and Mexican cartels such as the CJNG and La Familia Michoacana, both of which have already operationalized drone-delivered explosives.